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BOOK REVIEW
Congress versus the Supreme Court. By C. HERMAN PRITCHETT. Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1961. Pp. viii+ 168. $3.75.
The Supreme Court has weathered onslaughts by Presidents Jefferson, Jack-
son, Lincoln, and the two Roosevelts. It has experienced changes in the num-
ber of its justices by Congresses desiring to change or preserve the status quo.
Its appellate jurisdiction has been diminished. Prior to the Civil War the lib-
erals violently criticized the Court as a bulwark of slavery. In the last decade
of the 19th century the radicals assailed the Court's protection of vested inter-
ests and corporate privilege. Under the second Roosevelt liberal groups united
in their efforts to force the Court to approve legislation designed to cope with
economic problems of the greatest magnitude. Much has been written of the
manner in which the Court faced its detractors, losing stature on occasion, but
gaining increasing prestige, respect, and solid footing over the years.
In this book Professor Pritchett discusses the above, but his basic concerns
are with the attempts and the effects of the attempts of basically conservative
groups to secure passage of legislation designed to limit the Court's powers in
national security matters because of decisions rendered in that field from 1955
to 1958. From the Constitutional Revolution of 1937 to 1954 the Court was
relatively free of criticism. The Brown v. Board of Education' decision sub-jected the High Court to a barrage of criticism basically from Southern
sources. The Pennsylvania v. Nelson2 decision, holding that Congress had pre-
empted the field of sedition, offended many who believed the opinion was an
unwarranted assault on federalism. Several rulings unfavorable to the states
under Taft-Hartley added fuel to the fire as did the Court's expanding role
under due process in state criminal prosecutions. Pritchett explains how these
forces in 1958 and 1959 united with those who believed that the Supreme
Court unduly favored the rights of individuals at the expense of national secu-
rity.
Detailed analysis is given to the "legislative investigation issue" as exempli-
fied in Watkins v. United States3 wherein the Court set forth certain standards
for Congressional investigating committees. In Barenblatt v. United States4
much of the effect of Watkins was eliminated. Sweezy v. New Hampshire5
limited the scope of investigations authorized by state legislatures, while Up-
haus v. Wyman8 made Sweezy largely ineffective. Uphaus also eliminated much
of the sweeping effect of preemption in the field of sedition.
Dennis v. United States,7 upholding the constitutionality of the Smith Act's
criminal conspiracy organization and advocacy features, lost much of its vi-
tality when Yates v. United Statess defined the meaning of organization and
set forth the proof necessary. Pritchett's book was published before the Court's
1347 U.S. 483 (1954). 5 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
2 350 U.S. 497 (1956). 6 360 U.S. 72 (1959).
3 354 U.S. 178 (1957). 7 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
4 360 U.S. 109 (1959). 8 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
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decisions in Scales v. United States9 and Communist Party of the United
States v. Subversive Activities Control Board'0 which gave the government
new and potent weapons in its fight against communism.
The broad dictum that the right to travel is a freedom protected by the fifth
amendment, set forth in Kent v. Dulles," may, in Pritchett's view, have been
limited the Supreme Court's refusing to review lower court holdings that
the government could limit travel in certain countries at its discretion.12
The "loyalty-security issue" in the case of employees brought forth its most
significant case in Greene v. McElroy13 when the Court, with a more favora-
ble attitude toward personal rights, intimated the unconstitutionality of an in-
dustrial security program denying confrontation and information as to source
of charges in a security hearing. This case was deprived of much of its effect
by Cafeteria &' Restaurant Workers Union Local 473, AFL-CIO v. McElroy 14
which held that an employee of a private contractor could be removed from
her job in a United States Naval Gun Factory for security reasons without a
hearing or confrontation.
The "right to silence," affirmed in the first Konigsberg case"r and in
Slocho'wer v. Board of Higher Education of New York City,16 was curtailed
in Lerner v. Casey17 and Beilan v. Board of Public Education.'8 The book was
published before the holdings in the second Konigsberg case' 9 and Cohen v.
Hurley2O were announced. In those cases the "right to silence" was further
curtailed.
After the Court's earlier pronouncements of its libertarian views, numerous
proposals were made to restrict its authority particularly by limiting its juris-
diction in preemption and certain appellate fields. These legislative programs
ended in virtually complete failure. Pritchett reasons that failure resulted be-
cause of a prevailing view that influence should be exerted on the Court only
in the appointing power when vacancies occur, because the character and mo-
tives of some of the proponents of restrictive legislation were of dubious qual-
ity, because charges made against the Court were at times without substance,
and because the Court had begun a change in position. The confirmation of
Justices Whittaker and Stewart made the Court more conservative.
Pritchett emphasizes that the shift in the Court's attitude toward national
security as weighed against personal rights differed from the Court's position
in 1937 when it abandoned its bastions in the face of retaliatory legislation.
9 367 U.S. 203 (1961).
10 367 U.S. 1 (1961).
11 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
12 Porter v. Herter, 278 F.2d 280 (D.C. Cir. 1960) cert. denied, 361 U.S. 918 (1959).
13 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
14 367 U.S. 886 (1961).
15 Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252 (1957).
10 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
17 357 U.S. 468 (1958).
18 357 U.S. 399 (1958).
19 Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 360 U.S. 36 (1961).
20 366 U.S. 117 (1961).
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Here in 1958 and subsequently the probability of retaliatory legislation had
largely passed when'the justices handed down modified opinions based for the
most part on a contrary philosophy.The book presents a well documented explanation of the forces that pushed
the 'Court curbing proposals, the cases that furnished the ammunition,; and the
reasons for failure. In 1958 and Subsequently there was no Constitutional Revo-
lution as there was in 1937. Rather a differently oriented court in a different
generation accomplished evolution toward an approach less libertarian than
the High Court which handed down decisions in the field of national security
from 1955 to 1958. We are presented with a contemporary viewpoint taking us
right through a major shift in position. Only to a limited degree was the shift
due to outside, pressures.
The author's weakness lies in his preference for the philosophy that pre-
vailed in the Court from 1955 to 1958. He presents, upholds, and affirms view-
points grounded in that philosophy. This makes the work less objective than it
otherwise might be. He has little appreciation for the court curbing efforts of
such highly respected and intellectual groups as the American Bar Association
and the Conference of State Supreme Court Justices, both of which organiza-
tions sided with those who criticized the decisions which seemed to favor the
rights of individuals. For instance, he says: "The Bar Association's pronounce-
ments fell far short of the intellectual standards one would expect from such
an organization." Justice Douglas' words are appropriate at this point: "For
the federal constitution is not a code, but a rule of action-a statement of phi-
losophy and point of view, a summation of general principles.... Democracy,
like religion, is full of sects and schisms.'"2' Criticism of the Court, even when
expressed in terms of limiting its jurisdiction and powers, is a healthy part of
the democratic process.
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